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Cohen: A Toss of the Dice...The Gamble with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws

A TOSS OF THE DICE ... THE GAMBLE
WITH POST-DIVORCE RELOCATION LAWS
In recent years, the increased mobility of American society' has
generated a remarkable change in the law governing interstate child
custody determinations.' Traditional state control of family law' has

bowed to the need for uniformity" induced by "the practical demands of a mobile society in today's shrinking world . . . . " State
legislatures, concerned over loss of jurisdiction in child custody de1. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, reflecting on increased mobility, has "take[n] judicial cognizance of the fact that men and women are readily subject to job transfer in our
society and equity demands that they should be free to go where their best opportunities
... Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 168,
lie.
210 So. 2d 52 (1968); see Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 525, 711 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App.
1985) (noting that this is "now a mobile society"); In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316,
334, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1047 (1988) (recognizing that "our society is a mobile one."). See
generally BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1988 21, 43 (108th ed. 1987) (describing population shifts around the
country).
2. For example, federal law now provides the rule of decision in interstate child custody
controversies concerning unlawful parental relocation, preempting traditional state legislative
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dennis, 366 N.W.2d 474, 475 (N.D. 1985) (utilizing the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as the basis for state family law decision).
3. See H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
19.1, at 787 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the doctrine of parens patriae,which gives the government power to protect children, is largely covered by state statutes); Hershkowitz, Due Process
and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 FAm. L.Q. 245, 247 (1985) (stating that "[a]
long-standing tradition in the United States dictates that federal courts will not assume jurisdiction in domestic relations matters even though diversity is present."). Custody-related proceedings, however, are still decided in state court, despite the origination of governing legislation. Cf. Comment, The ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act: Is There an Enforcement Role
for the Federal Courts?, 62 WASH. L. REv. 841, 841 (1987) (authored by Ann T. Wilson)
(advocating amendment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act "to allow federal court
enforcement of custody determinations in limited circumstances.").
4. State adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see 9 U.L.A. 115
(1988), for example, implies recognition of the need for uniformity. See generally Coombs,
Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REv. 711
(1982) (outlining child custody legislation in recent years); Tye, Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: An Overview of the Statute and Case Law as It Has Developed in Massachusetts, BOSTON B.J., Mar./Apr. 1987, at 32 (noting that adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was intended to lead to increased interstate cooperation and avoidance of
jurisdictional disputes).
5. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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terminations, first responded by adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.6 This state effort was supplemented by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 7 and the Parent Locator Service,"
federal answers to the inconsistent results caused by contradictory
state child custody decisions. 9 Such national legislation sought to
eliminate forum shopping by parents seeking to avoid unfavorable
child custody determinations.10
6. See 9 U.L.A. 115-16 (1988) (listing all fifty states and the District of Columbia as
jurisdictions in which the act has been adopted).
7. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.'Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat.
3568-73 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 654,
663 (1982)).
8. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2353 & Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 9(b), 94 Stat.
3572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 653, 663 (Supp. IV 1986)).
9. See 126 CONG. REc. 34133 (1980) (listing Congressional Findings and Purposes for
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7 (1980) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
10. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181-83 (1988) (recognizing that the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act requires states to afford full faith and credit to other state
court decisions to discourage forum shopping); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982) (governing the unlawful removal of a child from the jurisdiction controlling
custody); Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. §§ 653, 663 (Supp. IV 1986) (authorizing a federal mechanism to aid in the location of children taken without the court's permission). These
Acts add to the unifying effect of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115
(1988) (advocating uniformity as a cure for loss of jurisdiction).
Divergent state law still supplies the rule of decision in post-divorce relocation determinations, with guidelines created either by legislative or judicial decision. States with statutory
guidelines include: California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 213 (West 1982); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 609 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208,
§ 30 (West 1987); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 subdiv. 3 (West Supp. 1989);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1976); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-5-13 (1984); see also Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1964) (interpreting the California statute); In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 IlI. 2d 316, 518
N.E.2d 1041 (1988) (interpreting the Illinois statute); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395
Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985) (interpreting the Massachusetts statute); Auge v. Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983) (interpreting the Minnesota statute); Holder v. Polansky, 111
N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852 (1988) (interpreting the New Jersey statute); In re Ehlen, 303
N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981) (interpreting the South Dakota statute).
In many states, removal conflicts are resolved by common law. See, e.g., Alabama, Pons v.
Phillips, 406 So. 2d 932 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied sub nom., Ex parte Phillips, 406 So. 2d
935 (Ala. 1981); Arizona, Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1985); Colorado, Casida v. Casida, 659 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 1982); Connecticut, Blake v. Blake, 207
Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988); Florida, Cole v. Cole, 530 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Iowa, In re Marriage
of Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Louisiana, Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283
So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Michigan, Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 358
N.W.2d 383 (1984); Montana, In re Marriage of Cole, 224 Mon. 207, 729 P.2d 1276 (1986);
Nebraska, Gerber v. Gerber, 225 Neb. 611, 407 N.W.2d 497 (1987); New York, Weiss v.
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981); Tennessee, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. 1988); Oregon, In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 595 P.2d
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With respect to the laws governing post-divorce relocation of
custodial parents, this Note argues in favor of a further nationwide
movement towards uniformity" through federal legislation to ease
the fears over loss of jurisdiction by the states in interstate child custody conflicts. 12 Presently, post-divorce relocation laws vary widely
from state to state and govern situations which have been aggravated
by the increased mobility of American society. 13
I. AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE

POST-DIVORCE

RELOCATION

CONTROVERSY

Any judicial determination involving the relocation of a custodial parent

4

engenders conflict between the interests of the parents,

474 (1979); Oklahoma, Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 702 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1985); South Carolina,
McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322 (1982); Texas, Wood v. Wood, 510
S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Virginia, Simmons v. Simmons, 1 Va. App. 358, 339
S.E.2d 198 (1986); Wisconsin, Bohms v. Bohms, 144 Wis. 2d 490, 424 N.W.2d 408 (1988).
11. See infra notes 20-21 (discussing divergent state holdings).
12. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the states' fear concerning the loss
of control over custody and visitation determinations).
13. Unifying legislation, like the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115
(1988), and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), should be
extended into the relocation arena because:
[iun the past, removal was commonly denied because of the potential loss of jurisdiction over custody issues. This concern has largely been met by adoption ... of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [and the] [flurther protection of the rights
of both parents ... afforded by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
[which authorized the Parent Locator Service].
Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983) (citations omitted). See generally Coombs,
supra note 4 (outlining the effects of child custody legislation in recent years); Tye, supra note
4 (noting that adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has led to increased
interstate cooperation and avoidance of jurisdictional disputes); Recent Decisions, 30 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 94, 98-102 (1955) (reviewing pre-Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
pre-Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act fears about permitting relocation); Comment, supra
note 3 (addressing problems of enforcement in a general overview of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act).
14. Relocation can be contested during both the original divorce and custody proceeding,
and as a separate issue at a later date. See infra note 36 (outlining the situations in which
conflicts over relocation arise). This Note presupposes a situation in which either parent is
capable of custodianship of the minor child or children involved. It also assumes that both
parents are acting in good faith and that the custodian's desire to move is not intended to
undermine the other parent's visitation privileges. See infra note 39 (noting good faith reasons
for desiring relocation). This Note presumes that the noncustodial parent objects to the move
for fear of a dwindling relationship with the child. See infra note 40 (noting that such fear is a
good faith objection to relocation).
This Note uses the terms "relocation" and "removal" interchangeably to indicate the
resettling of a custodial parent and child in a jurisdiction other than that which granted the
original custody decree.
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the child, and the state.15 The parents wish to protect their freedom
of travel 6 and their parental rights, 7 while the state is concerned
with loss of jurisdiction18 and protection of the child's welfare.19
The rules governing post-divorce relocation of custodial parents
vary significantly from state to state. At one side of the controversy
is a presumption in favor of the custodial parent's desire to relocate,2° while the other extreme endorses a presumption favoring the
non-custodial parent's objection to relocation.21 Due to the multiplic15. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397-99 (Minn. 1983) (outlining the issues and
concerns involved in relocation determinations).
16. The Supreme Court has long recognized and protected the travel privilege, which is
inferred from various sections of the Constitution. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW § 16-8, at 1455-57 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the sources for constitutional protection of
freedom of travel include the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV and the fourteenth amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment); cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (declaring unconstitutional a
Nevada statute imposing a tax on all persons exiting state by common carrier); The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating state laws requiring ship masters to pay a
tax on disembarking passengers).
17. Arizona has held that "the term 'parental rights' includes the right to care, custody
and control by the parent .... Anguis v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz. App. 68, 71, 429 P.2d 702,
705 (1967). These rights include the "[p]hysical possession of the child which, in the case of a
custodial parent includes the day-to-day care and companionship of the child. In the case of a
non-custodial parent, possession is tantamount to the right to visitation." L.A.M. v. State, 547
P.2d 827, 832-33 n.13 (Alaska 1976).
18. See supra note 13 (discussing state concerns over loss of jurisdiction).
19. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that state courts consider the best
interests of the child as a paramount concern).
20. See, e.g., Pons v. Phillips, 406 So. 2d 932, 935 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (holding that
in the absence of a court order to the contrary, a custodial parent has a right to relocate
elsewhere); Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 494, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489, 500 (1964)
(perceiving the right to relocate as part of the custodial parent's right to choose a residence for
him or herself and the minor child involved); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.
1983) (acknowledging a presumption that removal be permitted "subject to the noncustodial
parent's ability to establish that removal is not in the best interests of the child."); Madgett v.
Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "[t]here is a presumption
that a request by the custodial parent to remove the child to another state is in the best
interests of the child." (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 1983)));
Holder v. Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 349, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (1988) (reversing an earlier standard favoring restriction of removal and endorsing a presumption in favor of the custodial
parent's freedom of travel); see also infra notes 99-121 and accompanying text (discussing
New Jersey, Minnesota, Alabama, and California relocation cases, statutes and standards involving relocation).
21. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 325-26, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044
(1988) (construing the Illinois relocation statute to require the custodial parent to bear the
burden of proof that the move will not undermine the child's best interests); Quirin v. Quirin,
50 III. App. 3d 785, 788, 365 N.E.2d 226, 228 (1977) (holding that "[t]he burden of proof is
. I *on the party seeking judicial approval of the proposed removal" to establish that the move
is in the children's best interest); Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 702 P.2d 42, 45 (Okla. 1985) (holding that a relocation which effectively deprives the noncustodial parent of visitation is a change
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ity of contradictory state laws, parents who divorce are virtually roll-

ing the dice, staking their extended futures in the relocation law
game of chance. 2

State relocation statutes previously restricted relocation because
the states feared a loss of control over custody and visitation determinations23 and wanted to protect the child's best interests through

parens patriaejurisdiction.2 4 These concerns no longer affect relocation determinations. Today, state interests are secured by the availa-

bility of alternative visitation schedules 25 and the protections proof circumstances and supports a modification of custody); McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C.
481, 482, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 1982) (recognizing a presumption against relocation); see
also In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 445-46, 595 P.2d 474, 478 (1979) (holding that it
is contrary to public policy to allow removal, except if it is in the best interests of the child);
infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test set forth in In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (1988)); infra note 57 (reviewing South
Carolina restrictions on relocation). See generally Note, A Proposed "Best Interests" Test for
Removing a Child from the Jurisdictionof the Noncustodial Parent, 51 FORDHAM L. REV.
489, 490 (1982) (authored by Peter Ted Surace) (arguing that "a child's best interests are
safeguarded only if the custodial parent is required to satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden.").
22. This extended future is the length of time remaining until the youngest child reaches
the age of consent. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1976) (providing that "[children] ...
shall not be removed out of [the] jurisdiction against their own consent, if of suitable age to
signify the same, nor while under that age without the consent of both parents ....").
23. See generally Recent Decisions, supra note 13, at 98-102 (reviewing pre-Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and pre-Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act fears about permitting relocation).
24. Parenspatriaejurisdiction gives the states the right to care for the welfare of children, and derives from the English Crown's power to protect those unable to protect themselves. See H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 787. See generally Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine
of Parens Patriae,27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978) (outlining the foundations of the parens patriae
doctrine).
25. The different types of visitation schedules include split weeks, alternating days or
months and school time versus vacation time. See Woolley, Shared ParentingArrangements,
in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 16 (J. Folberg ed. 1984) (reviewing possible
shared parenthood arrangements). As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized:
A realistic and reasonable visitation schedule is one that will provide an adequate
basis for preserving and fostering a child's relationship with the noncustodial parent
if the removal is allowed.... [T]he court should not insist that the advantages of
the move be sacrificed and the opportunity for a better and more comfortable life
style . . . be forfeited solely to maintain weekly visitation .. . where reasonable

alternative visitation is available and where the advantages of the move are
substantial.
Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 57-58, 491 A.2d 606, 614 (1984), overruled on other grounds
by, Holder v. Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852 (1988) (citations omitted). It has been
further noted in New Jersey that:
It is at least arguable, and the literature does not suggest otherwise, that the alternative of uninterrupted visits of a week or more in duration several times a year,
where the father [in this case the noncustodial parent] is in constant and exclusive
parental contact with the children and has to plan and provide for them on a daily
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vided by uniform national legislation.2" These factors combine to
permit a state to adjust present standards without fear of harm to
the child or loss of jurisdiction. Therefore, the "accident" of where a
divorce takes place should affect neither the strength nor the importance of either parent's individual rights.2 7
Further legislation is necessary to standardize the requirements
governing the legal relocation of parent and child after a divorce.28
A new uniform state law, or additional federal action " could balance the conflicting interests of the parents and the states, while rec-

onciling the differing state requirements,"0 retaining traditional state
court jurisdiction over child custody matters, 1 and insuring the
child's well-being. 32 This Note explores the current divergence between the states,33 suggests a compromise between the different jurisdictional standards, 3 4 and proposes a model for unifying
legislation. 5
II.

THE QUANDARY OF POST-DIVORCE RELOCATION

Post-divorce relocation becomes a problem if a custodial parent
wants to leave the jurisdiction granting the original custody decree,
basis, may well serve the paternal relationship better than the typical weekly visit
which involves little if any exercise of real paternal responsibility.
D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30, aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976). See generally C. WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFTER
DIVORCE; AN ENLIGHTENED CUSTODY GUIDE FOR MOTHERS, FATHERS AND KIDS 159-80
(1982) (outlining a planning guide for shared custody).
26. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
27. For example, if a family lived in several states during the course of the marriage,
and only "accidentally" winds up in a state with a restrictive removal law at the time of
divorce, that law will control custodial parent's ability to relocate for the remaining minority of
the children. See supra note 21 (noting states with presumptions against the custodial parent's
relocation). Alternatively, if the state with jurisdiction over the divorce has a less restrictive
removal standard, the noncustodial parent, no matter how involved in the child's life, will have
a very difficult task preventing relocation by the custodial parent. See supra note 20 (noting
States which have presumptions in favor of the custodial parent's relocation).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 145-50 (outlining suggested legislation).
29. See infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text (discussing the relative advantages
and disadvantages of uniform state law and federal legislation).
30. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (outlining the conflicting interests of
parents and states); supra notes 20-21 (discussing the differences between state relocation
laws).
31. See supra note 3 (tracing state court jurisdiction of child custody matters).
32. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (noting that the child's best interest is
of paramount concern to courts).
33. See infra notes 54-121 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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over the objection of the noncustodial parent.36 In this situation there
are three leading actors: the father, the mother and the minor child.
One parent may be awarded physical custody,3 while the other is
granted visitation rights.3 8 There are a number of good faith reasons
36. Questions about relocation generally arise in two contexts: as part of the original
divorce proceeding, see Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (involving relocation as permitted under the final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (granting custody and permission to
mother to remove to another state in judgment of divorce), or after a divorce decree has been
finalized. See Cole v. Cole, 530 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that relocation
warranted modification of the custody determination); In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Il1.2d
316, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (1988) (considering mother's desire to move as a modification of custody decision); Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (considering father's objection to custodial mother's move as a request for modification of custody decision). South Dakota's leading relocation case, however, decided the question of removal in the
context of an unwed mother, subsequently married to another man and over the objection of
the natural father. See In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1981).
This Note deals with these two situations interchangeably, since most of the underlying
issues and determinations are similar. The actual procedural posture might, however, lead to a
different interpretation of a standard, especially when the desire to relocate after the divorce
decree is finalized is considered a custody modification. See infra notes 82, 95 (noting the
effects of differences in procedural posture on relocation decision-making).
This Note does not deal with (1) questions of forum arising under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988); (2) questions of removal without notice to the
noncustodial parent arising under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A (1982); or (3) questions of removal that do not involve a breakup of the nuclear family.
37. By simple and practical definition, "[p]hysical custody refers to which parent will be
granted the 'routine daily care and control and the residence of the child.'" Raines, Joint
Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and PsychologicalImplications, 24 J.FAM. L. 625,
626 (1985-86) (citation omitted); see infra notes 93-94 (delineating the differences between
physical and legal custody). In this Note "custodial parent" refers to the parent with physical
custody.
The mother is the parent most often granted physical custody. See BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at 43,
chart no. 56 (108th ed. 1987) (noting that in 1987 there were 1,451,000 mother-child subfamilies, compared to only 123,000 father-child subfamilies in the United States); cf. Holder v.
Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 349, 544 A.2d 852, 854-55 (1988). In Holder, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that:
[flormerly, custody of children of tender years was generally awarded to the
mother. With increasing frequency, however, mothers and fathers now share the
responsibility for the care and custody of their children and the support of the family. Consequently, courts have begun to make more frequent awards of custody to
fathers and, in appropriate cases, to make joint custody awards. Nonetheless, in
many instances, the mother still receives custody of the children, and the father is
awarded visitation rights.

Id. (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 349, 544 A.2d at 854. In Holder, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that "[w]hen children are involved [in a divorce], one parent receives physical or residential
custody and the other parent receives visitation rights. Alternatively, the parents may enter
into an arrangement for joint custody." Id.; cf. Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "[t]he visitation schedule should be realistic and reasonable and
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why a custodial parent might want to remove the child from the
state with jurisdiction over custody arrangements, 39 despite the objection of the noncustodial parent.40 Traditionally, the noncustodial
parent retains the freedom to move around, without regard to the
location of the child or the custodial parent.4" As noted in New
Jersey, "a noncustodial parent is perfectly free to remove himself
from this jurisdiction despite the continued residency here of his
children in order to seek opportunities for a better or different lifestyle for himself." 42 Custodial parents, on the other hand, who are
primarily responsible for the child after a divorce,43 have to restrict
their own movements to enable the noncustodial parents to exercise
parental rights.44
In relocation cases, every member of the broken family unit has
a separate interest to be considered.45 Since children are the innocent
provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent." (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 57, 491 A.2d 606, 614 (1984))).
39. Good faith reasons for a relocation may include remarriage, better employment, and
return to hometown and family. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 172, 175-76, 418 N.E.2d
377, 378, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863, 865 (1981) (noting that the mother's plans to relocate
to "make 'a new life'" were made in good faith). Bad faith, such as a desire to wreak vengeance upon a despised spouse, alters this situation entirely. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d
393, 398 (Minn. 1983) (stating that removal should not be allowed for frivolous or spiteful
reasons); Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (finding a
mother's plans in good faith when there was "no suggestion that she was motivated by a desire
to put the child out of the reach of the father or to jeopardize their relationship .... " (citations omitted)). See generally R. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 247-48 (1986) (identifying specious reasons used
by parents to thwart the desires of the ex-spouse).
40. The noncustodial parent makes a good faith objection based on the belief that his/
her relationship with the child will suffer. See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704,
481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985); Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 590, 358 N.W.2d 383,
385 (1984); D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27, aft'd per curiam, 144
N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976).
41. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 398; In re Marriage of Cole, 224 Mont. 207, 212-13, 729
P.2d 1276, 1280 (1986); D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 207, 365 A.2d at 30.
42. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 207, 365 A.2d at 30.
43. Since the child lives with the custodial parent, he or she has the major responsibility
for day to day living arrangements. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397 (stating that "the custodial
parent is allowed wide discretion in determining the educational, health, and religious needs of
the child . . . ."); see also Casida v. Casida, 659 P.2d 56, 57 (Colo. App. 1982) (recognizing

the custodial parent's "great latitude in carrying out the custodial responsibilities of providing
a primary home for the minor children of the parties.").
44. See Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56, 491 A.2d 606, 613 (1984) (recognizing that
"[t]he custodial parent's freedom to move is qualified . . . by the competing interest of the
noncustodial parent."); see also Fournie, Post-Divorce Visitation:A Study in the Deprivation
of Rights, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 113 (1977) (exploring the rights of the parties involved in postdivorce situations).
45. See Signorelli v. Albano, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 939, 941, 486 N.E.2d 750, 751 (1985)
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victims in any divorce proceeding,46 the best interests of the child41
are of paramount concern to the courts.4 8 In fact, best interests is the
(stating that "[e]very person, parent and child, has an interest to be considered." (quoting
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 712 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (1985))). The custodial parent's interests are often measured by the advantage to be gained from the move in
terms of quality of life. Id. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. Yannas also assesses the custodial
parent's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of travel. See id.; see also Comment,
Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12
RUTOERs L.J. 341 (1981) (authored by Edward Sivin) (reviewing the constitutional right to
travel as it relates to child custody and parental rights). The non-custodial parent's competing
wish is to preserve the parent-child relationship through protection of visitation rights. See In
re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981); Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 590,
358 N.W.2d 383, 385 (1984). The child's interest is protected by the state, and the legal rights
of the children may be considered protected when their best interests are secure. See Yannas,
395 Mass. at 713, 481 N.E.2d at 1159.
46. See Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972) (noting that
"[i]nrecent years there has been an increasing awareness that, in divorce proceedings, the
children are themselves the most disadvantaged parties.").
47. In Yannas, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts formulated a definition for
determining a child's best interests:
An evaluation of the best interests of the child requires attention to whether the
quality of the child's life may be improved by the change (including any improvement flowing from an improvement in the quality of the custodial parent's life), the
possible adverse effect of the elimination or curtailment of the child's association
with the noncustodial parent, and the extent to which moving or not moving will
affect the emotional, physical, or developmental needs of the child.
395 Mass. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. For a complete discussion of the best interests of the
child standard, see generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J.KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980);
Bassett, Petitionfor Change of Domicile: Conflicting Standardsfrom the Appellate Courts,
62 MICH. B.J. 423 (1983) (calling for action by the state supreme court to resolve conflicts
between the lower courts); Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and
Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267 (1987) (discussing the best interests standard);
Henszey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What is the "Best Interest Doctrine?", 15 J.
FAM. L. 213 (1976-77) (discussing the best interests standard in the context of the issue of
visitation); Mnookin, Child- Custody Adjudicatior" JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); Pastis, Residence Restrictions on Custodial
Parents:Sex-Based Discrimination?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 419, 425-30 (1986) (discussing the burden of proof and burden of production in connection with the best interests
standard).
48. Courts in many jurisdictions have expressed this concern. See Alabama, Pons v.
Phillips, 406 So. 2d 932, 934 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Ex parte Phillips, 406
So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1981); Arizona, Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 525, 711 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct.
App. 1985); Colorado, Casida v. Casida, 659 P.2d 56, 58 (Colo. App. 1982); Florida, McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Illinois, In re Marriage of
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 324, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1988); Louisiana, Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Massachusetts, Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, 481
N.E.2d at 1158; Minnesota, Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983); Montana, see
In re Marriage of Cole, 224 Mont. 207, 210, 729 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1986); Nebraska, Gerber
v. Gerber, 225 Neb. 611, 618, 407 N.W.2d 497, 502 (1987); New Jersey, Holder v. Polansky,
III N.J. 344, 354, 544 A.2d 852, 857 (1988); New York, Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170,
175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981); Oklahoma, Hornbeck v. Hornbeck,
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standard by which their legal rights are protected.4 9 The "best interests doctrine," in the context of custodial parent relocation,5" varies
in meaning from state to state. 51 A state with a permissive relocation
standard will require the noncustodial parent to prove that the move
will undermine the child's best interests, 2 while a state that restricts
relocation will compel the custodial parent to 53prove that the intended
move will improve the child's quality of life.
III.

THE MULTIPLICITY OF STATE RELOCATION LAWS

Whether created by statutory authority or judicial decision,54
the state laws controlling post-divorce relocation vary widely, 55 with
a trend across the country towards decreasing removal constraints.56
702 P.2d 42, 43 (Okla. 1985); Oregon, In re Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 445, 595 P.2d
474, 478 (1979) (citing Perley v. Perley, 220 Or. 399, 349 P.2d 663, 664-65 (1960)); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth ex rel. McTighe v. Lindsey, 157 Pa. Super. 560, 562, 40 A.2d 881, 882
(1945); South Carolina, McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 482, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323
(1982); South Dakota, In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981); Texas, Wood v. Wood,
510 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex Civ. App. 1974) (non-removal child custody case); Utah, Ebbert v.
Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (visitation dispute); Virginia, Simmons v.
Simmons, I Va. App. 358, 361, 339 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1986); Wisconsin, Bohms. v. Bohms, 144
Wis. 490, 494, 424 N.W.2d 408, 411 (1988).
49. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 712-13, 481 N.E.2d at 1158-59 (finding that safeguarding
a child's best interests protects his/her constitutional and other rights).
50. See supra note 47 (defining best interests in terms of relocation decisions).
51. The divergence in state court opinions over the meaning of "best interest" has led to
conflicts in interpretation when these courts quote each other in the various cases. Compare
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (requiring "exceptional
circumstances" to allow relocation, with special emphasis on the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent); with Bloss 147 Ariz. at 525-26, 711 P.2d at 664-65 (reinterpreting Weiss,
without special emphasis on any particular conflicting interest, to apply a significantly less
restrictive standard for relocation).
52. See, e.g., Holder 111 N.J. at 344, 544 A.2d at 852 (requiring the noncustodial parent to prove that relocation will damage the child's relationship with that parent); see also
Infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 325, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044
(1988) (implying that relocation will only be allowed if the move benefits the child); see also
infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text (discussing the various factors weighed by the Eckert
court).
54. See supra notes 20-21 (outlining the various state laws).
55. Compare Eckert, 119 II1. 2d at 326, 518 N.E.2d at 1044 (recognizing a strong presumption against relocation); with Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing a presumption that removal is in the best interests of the child).
56. See, e.g., Eckert, 119 II1. 2d at 326, 518 N.E.2d at 1045 (stating that a "reading of
case law. . . indicate[s] a trend which would permit removal unless rather strong negative
circumstances indicated against it."). The line of New Jersey relocation decisions is indicative
of this trend. See generally infra notes 71, 99-110 and accompanying text (discussing the New
Jersey cases).
Under the least restrictive view, the right to relocate and decide upon a residence for the
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Although no jurisdiction forbids relocation outright, some states apply a very restrictive standard that places the burden of proving that
the move will not undermine the child's best interests squarely on the
custodial parent, thereby creating a heavy presumption in favor of
the noncustodial parent's objection. 57 This type of standard, as defined in In re Marriage of Eckert,58 implies that the custodial parent
child lies with the custodial parent. See Dozier v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 714, 334 P.2d 957,
961 (1959) (stating that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a mother having custody of the
child should be permitted to move about freely, and any unnecessary or arbitrary restriction on
her residence is unreasonable."). The court will restrain this right if harm to the child would
ensue. See 334 P.2d at 962 (refusing relocation because of evidence that the child's health
would suffer if relocated from California to Connecticut); see also CAL CIV. CODE § 213
(West 1982), set forth infra note 120. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d
749, 55 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1966) (permitting a father's relocation only after he posted a bond to
insure against loss of the mother's visitation rights).
However, in Szamocki v. Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 121 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975), the
California Court of Appeals held that "[riemoval of children from the state without the consent of the noncustodial parent or the court is not approved even where the judgment of dissolution does not specifically require the custodial parent to reside in California." Id. at 818, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 234. The bad faith of the custodial parent had a tremendous impact on this
decision. Specifically, the custodial parent, after leaving the state with the child without warning to the noncustodial parent, was denied the ability to collect child support unpaid during
her absence. Id. at 819-20, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 235. The court did not make reference to the
earlier relocation cases of Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964) or Dozier v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 334 P.2d 957 (1959), which
should have had some influence on the court's language about relocation. Cf. Szamocki, 47
Cal. App. 3d at 812, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 231. Given the court's focus on the collection of past
due support payments, the holding on relocation in this case is arguably dicta. Id. Moreover,
because of the custodial parent's bad faith, Szamocki is beyond the scope of this Note. See
supra notes 13, 39 (setting out examples of good faith reasons for relocation which are within
the scope of this Note).
57. New York, see infra notes 68-72, and South Carolina have very strict, judicially
created standards. South Carolina common law recognizes that "the presumption is against
removal of the child . . . [although if it] will benefit the child, removal has been allowed."
McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 483, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1982) (citations omitted).
This standard is somewhat stricter than the Illinois statutory standard construed in In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Il1. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (1988); see infra note 67 (setting forth the
relocation section of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act). The difference is
that the South Carolina Supreme Court specifically requires a benefit to the child, see McAlister, 278 S.C. at 483, 299 S.E.2d at 323, while the Illinois high court merely implies the requirement. See Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 316, 518 N.E.2d at 1041; infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois standard); see also Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 702 P.2d 42,
45 (Okla. 1985) (holding that relocation that effectively deprives the noncustodial parent of
visitation is a change of circumstances and therefore supports a modification of custody); In re
Marriage of Meier, 286 Or. 437, 446, 595 P.2d 474, 478 (1979) (holding that it is contrary to
public policy to allow removal, except if it is in the best interests of the child). See generally
Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J.
FAM. L. 625 (1986) (arguing that removal should not be allowed if joint custody has functioned effectively).
58. 119 Ill. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (1988). Eckert was the test case for the Illinois
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must demonstrate that a move will affirmatively benefit the child, in
order to prove that relocation is in the child's best interests.5 9 This is
considerably more difficult than showing that relocation is not inconsistent with the child's well-being. 60 The Eckert standard uses a balancing test,"' which includes such factors as (1) whether the general
quality of life for both the custodial parent and child would be enhanced,62 (2) whether both parents' motives for and against relocation were appropriate, 3 (3) whether a reasonable visitation schedule
could be arranged, 4 and (4) whether the noncustodial parent had
exercised previous visitation rights.65 The various elements are then
weighted so as to almost preclude relocation.66 In Eckert, this was
accomplished by placing the most emphasis on what the state supreme court termed the "policy" of the relocation statute-to secure
maximum involvement of both parents in the child's upbringing,
relocation statute, as amended. See infra note 67 (setting forth the Illinois relocation statute).
In Eckert, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically pointed out that despite the lower court's
recognition of a trend across the country permitting removal in the absence of strong negative
evidence against it, any decision reflecting that trend was directly contrary to the express language of the statute. Eckert, 119 IIl. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. Reversing the lower court
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the mother's request for relocation. Id.
59. See id. at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1045 (setting forth factors to be considered when
determining a child's best interests).
60. This was the standard followed in Illinois before the burden of proof clause, emphasized infra note 67, was added to the Illinois relocation statute in 1982. See In re Marriage of
Burgham, 86 III. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980); see also infra notes 73-98 and accompanying text (reviewing other jurisdictions applying a standard similar to Burgham). The addition of this clause specifically placed the burden of proof on the custodial parent. See Eckert,
119 III. 2d at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1044.
Burgham, decided just before the amendment, allowed a custodial parent to make a
prima fade case for removal by demonstrating that the parent wanted to move for a sensible
reason which included a superficial showing that the move was consistent with the child's best
interests. 86 III. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980); cf. Eckert, 119 IlI. 2d at 325-26, 518
N.E. 2d at 1044-45 (discussing the tie between Burgham, decided in 1980, and the statute,
which became effective on January 1, 1982). The Burgham holding is consistent with the law
in South Dakota today. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
61. A balancing test is the most common method used by the different states for determining best interests. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 67 (listing the elements considered by the Illinois Eckert decision); infra note 71 (outlining the D'onofrio balancing test and
those states referring to this test); infra note 105 (listing the factors balanced in Iowa under In
re Marriage of Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); supra note 47 (noting the
elements of the Yannas balancing test).
62. See Eckert, 119 Il.2d at 326-27, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
63. See id. at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See infra note 70 (describing the weight of different elements in the Illinois and
New York balancing tests).
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both during and after a divorce.

7

New York, without specific statutory guidance,6" created the

"exceptional circumstances test" in Weiss v. Weiss. 9 This is virtually the same as the Illinois test in terms of burden of proof,70 implying that a move will only be allowed when there is a "dramatic
change in circumstances."'" The custodial parent's good faith alone
67. See Eckert 119 Ill.
2d at 330-31, 518 N.E.2d at 1046 (stating that "the purpose of
the [Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage] Act is to 'secure the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and emotional
well-being of the children during and after the litigation.'" (citations omitted)). The Illinois
relocation statute provides:
(a) The court may grant leave, before or after judgment, to any party having custody of any minor child or children to remove such child or children from Illinois
whenever such approval is in the best interests of such child or children. The burden
of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such child or children is on
the party seeking the removal. When such removal is permitted, the court may
require the party removing such child or children from Illinois to give reasonable
security guaranteeing the return of such children.
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, para. 609 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). The italicized
language amending § 609 became effective January 1, 1982. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325-26, 518
N.E.2d at 1044-45 (discussing the burden of proof in the Illinois relocation statute).
In Eckert, after thoroughly questioning whether the move would benefit the child and the
mother's motives for the move, the court found that (1) she had insufficient reason for the
move, (2) she did not adequately dispel the evidence of bad faith concerning her desire for the
move, and (3) she did not met her burden of proof concerning the best interests of her child.
119 I11.
2d at 331-33, 518 N.E.2d at 1046-47. The court implied that her burden of proof was
not met because she could not show that the move would actually benefit the child. See id. In
addition, the court noted the father's exemplary parenting and outstanding relationship with
the child which weighed heavily against the mother's claim. Id. at 333, 518 N.E.2d at 1047.
The court also found a move to Arizona was unnecessary to enhance the mother's career. Id.
at 331-32, 518 N.E.2d at 1046. Absent bad faith and insufficient reason for relocation, however, the strict standard formulated in this case may be loosened in the future.
68. New York has no statute that specifically applies to relocation questions. Cf. Bloss v.
Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 525, 711 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding "New York and Michigan decisions dispositive because, as in Arizona, neither state has a statute which addresses"
the issue of relocation); Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862
(1981) (judicial determination of relocation issue).
69. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used the phrase to describe the New
York relocation standard in general. See Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 710,
481 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1985).
70. The New York balancing test, which led to the same strict standard as followed in
Illinois, gives the greatest weight to the noncustodial parent's interest in visitation. See Weiss,
52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Although at first glance New
York's test may seem more relaxed than Illinois', the New York Court of Appeals did not have
to weigh the effects of bad faith in their calculations. See id. The New York court denied
relocation through virtually the same reasoning, but the New York rule may actually be
tougher, because there is no bad faith factor with which to distinguish the Weiss decision in
later cases. See supra note 67 (noting that bad faith may have had an effect on the court's
relocation decision in Eckert).
71. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175-76, 418 N.E.2d at 382, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The dra-
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is not enough to allow relocation."
The "good reason test," as formulated by the South Dakota Supreme Court in In re Ehlen,73 is a slight modification of the New
York standard. Removal is allowed if the custodial parent has a good
matic change might include a career improvement, remarriage, or exceptional health or educational needs of the custodial parent or child. See id. This interpretation was recently followed
in Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 920, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1988). In Pecorello, however,
the custodial mother was allowed to relocate with the child because she had remarried and her
new husband had been involuntarily transferred. See id. at 920, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 350. The
court placed special emphasis upon the involuntary nature of the transfer, and did not require
a specific improvement for the child. See id.
Similarly, the Florida District Court of Appeals recently held that a custodial parent may
seek modification of a final judgment restricting relocation by "a showing of substantial or
material change of circumstances and [a showing] that the requested modification would be in
the best interests of the children." Cole v. Cole, 530 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); see also Dellapa, To Leave or Not To Leave (The Jurisdiction)-ThatIs the Question,
FLA. B.J., Nov. 1986, at 39, 41 (advocating concern for the happiness of the custodial parent).
But see McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that there is
no restriction on residence change unless contained in the final divorce decree); Note, Shared
ParentalResponsibility and Residence Restrictions in Florida,38 U. FLA. L. REV. 117, 120
(1986) (authored by Paul S. Quinn, Jr.) (proposing "that courts remove residential restrictions
only if the advantages to the child, the residential parent, and the new family unit outweigh
the harm to the child and the nonresidential parent."). The Cole court looked to the factors of
the D'onofrio balancing test, as related in Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56-57, 491 A.2d 606,
613 (1984). The four prongs of the D'onofrio test are:
[1] [the court] should consider the prospective advantages of the move in terms of
its likely capacity for improving the general quality of life for both the custodial
parent and the children. [2] It must evaluate the integrity of the motives of the
custodial parent in seeking the move in order to determine whether the removal is
inspired primarily by the desire to defeat or frustrate visitation by the noncustodial
parent, and whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with substitute visitation orders when she is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State. [3] It must likewise take into account the integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives in resisting the removal and consider the extent to which, if at all, the
opposition is intended to secure a financial advantage in respect of continuing support obligations. [4] Finally, the court must be satisfied that there will be a realistic
opportunity for visitation in lieu of the weekly pattern which can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental relationship with the noncustodial parent if removal is allowed.
D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206-07, 365 A.2d 27, 30, affd per curiam, 144
N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976). This test has been widely followed in later decisions.
See, e.g., Cole, 530 So. 2d at 469; Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 593, 358
N.W.2d 383, 386 (1984); Cooper, 99 N.J. at 57, 491 A.2d at 613.
72. See Eckert, 119 I11.
2d at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1044; Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176-77,
418 N.E.2d at 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66.
73. 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981). South Dakota relocation law is supplied by statute: "[a] parent entitled to the custody of a child has the right to change his residence, subject
to the power of the circuit court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or
welfare of the child." S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-5-13 (1984); see infra note 76 and
accompanying text (discussing the South Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of this
statute).
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reason for living in another state and the move is consistent with the
best interests of the child.74 The request to move is considered a
modification of the original custody decree, 76 and requires the custodial parent, who wishes to relocate, to seek a modification of custodial rights76 and to demonstrate a good reason for the move.7 7 This is
accomplished when the parent proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a "substantial and material change in
circumstances" ' 8 and that the "welfare and best interests of the
74. See Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810. A version of the "good reason" test has also been
formulated by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Gerber v. Gerber, 225 Neb. 611, 407 N.W.2d
497 (1987). Nebraska has held that:
[b]efore a court will permit removal of a child from the jurisdiction, generally, a
custodial parent must establish that such removal is in the best interests of the child
and must demonstrate that departure from the jurisdiction is the reasonably necessary result of the custodial parent's occupation, a factually supported and reasonable expectation of improvement in the career or occupation of the custodial parent,
or required by the custodial parent's remarriage.
Id. at 619, 407 N.W.2d at 503.
Arizona, which does not have a specific relocation statute, applies a similarly weighted
standard, without the requirement of a specific "good reason." See Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz.
524, 711 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1985). The custodial parent's good faith, however, is an implied
requirement, and has virtually the same effect as the "good reason" requirement. See id.; see
also infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the Arizona standard under Bloss).
Compare Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810 (requiring a specific "good reason" for relocation) with
Bloss, 147 Ariz. at 526, 711 P.2d at 665 (substituting an implied requirement of good faith for
the custodial parent's "good reason").
75. See Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810. For a discussion of custody modification standards,
as affected by the behavior of a custodial parent, see generally Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1984); Charlow,
supra note 47, at 267; Fournie, supra note 45, at 113; Henszey, supra note 47, at 213; see also
Comment, Recognizing ConstitutionalRights of Custodial Parents: The Primacy of the PostDivorce Family in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L. REv. 677 (1988)
(authored by Nancy B. Shernow); Comment, Best Interests Revisited: In Search of Guidelines, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 651 (authored by Laura B. Dupaix).
76. Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810. On its face, however, the South Dakota statute indicates
that the objecting party, in petitioning the court to exercise its restraint over relocation, is the
party seeking modification of custody. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-5-13 (1984); supra
note 73 (setting forth the South Dakota statute). In Ehlen, however, the custodial parent initiated the action seeking permission to relocate the children and modification of the custody
arrangement. Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810; infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (describing
the Ehlen decision, and the wording of the South Dakota statute). Ehlen involved vhildren of
an unwed couple, who had split up. 303 N.W.2d at 809. The court, allowing the mother to
relocate the children with the other man she subsequently married recognized the "stabilization of the mother's life" that her new situation provided. See id. at 809-10.
77. This test for "good reason" is actually a restatement from an earlier custody modification decision, not a custodial parent removal decision. See Engels v. Engels, 297 N.W.2d
489, 491 (S.D. 1980) (citing Masek v. Masek, 90 S.D. 1, 237 N.W.2d 432 (1976)).
78. Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810.
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child require the modification being sought. '79 Alihough a balancing
test similar to the "exceptional circumstances" test80 is used, the
"good reason" test makes it easier to establish a primafacie case for
removal. 8 ' In the "good reason" test, the standard of proof is less
stringent, and the objection of the noncustodial parent is not given
an increased emphasis.82
The "real advantage" test, as followed in Massachusetts under
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas,83 is next in the trend towards relaxing
relocation standards.84 This standard requires that the move result in
a "real advantage"8 5 to the custodial parent which is not inconsistent
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (describing the "exceptional circumstances" test).
81. Compare Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810 (requiring the parent to have a good reason for
the move not inconsistent with the child's best interests) with Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 418
N.E.2d at 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66 (requiring exceptional circumstances to allow a
removal that affects visitation). See generally supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Weiss "exceptional circumstances" test).
82, See Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d at 810; accord Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663
(Ct. App. 1985). Arizona, without a specific relocation statute, recognizes that relocation is a
modification of visitation, and must be judged by a balancing test that includes the best interests of all parties, emphasizing those of the child. Id. at 525-26, 711 P.2d at 664-65. The
court, however, describes its test as a "balance between the right to travel and parental
rights," Id. at 525, 711 P.2d at 664. Although citing the New York Weiss standard, Arizona
has actually created a truer "balancing" test because there is no extra emphasis on any one
element. See id.; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting the New York exceptional circumstances test); Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tenn. 1988) (requiring a
balance to determine a child's best interests without implying added weight on any single
element). The procedural posture in Bloss, however, makes it difficult to apply to other situations, because the thrust of the decision involved the propriety of the father's action in petitioning the court to enjoin the mother from leaving the jurisdiction. Bloss, 147 Ariz. at 524-26,
711 P.2d at 663-64. He claimed that the relocation was a de facto custody modification. Id.
The decision stated that his action was appropriate under the circumstances of the case, and
the trial court should have held a hearing to decide whether to restrict removal. Id. at 526, 711
P,2d at 665. The decision implied that the custodial parent should bear the burden of persuasion. See id. at 525-26, 711 P.2d at 664-65.
83. 395 Mass. 704, 481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985). This phrase was used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to describe the test formulated by the New Jersey courts. See
Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56, 491 A.2d 606, 618 (1984); D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J.
Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 30, aff'd per curiam 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976);
see also supra note 47 (noting the elements of the Yannas balancing test); supra note 71
(listing the requirements of the D'onofrio balancing test).
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the trend in relocation cases).
85. Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. The Supreme Judicial Court has
held:
In this process, the first consideration is whether there is a good reason for the
move, a "real advantage." If the custodial parent establishes a good, sincere reason
for wanting to remove to another jurisdiction, none of the relevant factors [of a
balancing test] becomes controlling in deciding the best interests of the child, but
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with the child's best interests."' As a threshold requirement, the custodial parent must come forward with a good faith reason for the
proposed relocation. At that point the burden of proof shifts to the
noncustodial parent to prove that the harm to visitation privileges
outweighs any advantage gained by the relocation.88 Although equal
emphasis is placed on each element of the balancing test,8 since the
rather they must be considered collectively.
Id.
86. The "real advantage" standard formulated in the Massachusetts Yannas case and
the New Jersey Cooper case differ in detail and implementation. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at
710-11, 481 N.E.2d at 1157-58; Cooper, 99 N.J. at 53-55, 491 A.2d. at 612. However, in both
cases "the real advantage test is grounded on the 'realization that after a divorce a child's
subsequent relationship with both parents can never be the same as before the divorce...
[and] that the child's quality of life and style of life are provided by the custodial parent.'"
Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1157 (quoting Cooper, 99 N.J. at 53, 491 A.2d, at
612). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interprets the cause requirement in its removal statute, see infra note 87, to indicate that the removal must be in the best interests of
the child. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (citing Rubin v. Rubin, 370
Mass. 857, 346 N.E.2d 919 (1976); Hale v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 429 N.E.2d 340
(1981)). Therefore, the central issue in a relocation case is a determination of what the "best
interests" actually are. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158; see also infra note
87 (setting forth the Massachusetts relocation statute).
In Michigan, under the Bielawski decision, "real advantage" applies to both the parent
and child, although the court implies that a good reason equals a real advantage. See Bielawski v. Bielawski, 137 Mich. App. 587, 591-94 358 N.W.2d 383, 385-86 (1984). The court
recognized that the child's gain can be derivative from the improved quality of life of the
custodial parent. See id. at 591, 358 N.W.2d at 385-386. The custodial parent must petition
the court, but the burden of proof borne by the custodial parent is very low and a pro-removal
presumption is reinforced by the ready availability of alternative visitation schedules. Id. Bielawski also held that "a motion for removal does not involve a custody determination," id., and
adopted the D'onofrio balancing test to determine whether removal should be allowed. Id.; see
supra note 71 (listing the elements of the D'onofrio balancing test).
87. Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court based its standard for removal on interpretation of the state relocation legislation. See id. The statute provides: "A minor child of divorced parents ... over whose custody
and maintenance a probate court has jurisdiction shall not ... be removed out of this commonwealth without ... the consent of both parents, unless the court upon cause shown otherwise
orders." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 30 (West 1987).
88. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158. The advantages to the custodial parent and the child, weighed against the harm to visitation are the major components of
the Massachusetts balancing test. See supra note 85 (noting the elements of the Yannas balancing test). These elements are basically the same as those used in the New Jersey D'onofrio
balancing test. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (relating the elements of the
D'onofrio balancing test). A similiar test is also followed in Iowa. See In re Marriage of
Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); see also infra note 105 (describing the
elements of the Stickle balancing test).
89. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158, in which the court stated
that:
none of the relevant factors becomes controlling in deciding the best interests of the
child, but rather they must be considered collectively. Every person, parent and
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custodial parent no longer bears the entire burden of proof,90 the
presumption has begun to favor removal.91 The Massachusetts court
also implied that any resulting adjustment to the noncustodial parent's visitation rights is not a modification of the custody decree. 92
The original custody determination is only amended by changing the
person originally granted physical 93 or legaf 9" custody. 95 In making
this distinction between physical and legal custody,96 the Yannas
child has an interest to be considered. The judicial safeguard[ing] of [individual]
interests lies in careful and clear fact-finding and not in imposing heightened burdens of proof or in inequitably identifying constitutional rights in favor of one person against another.
Id. (emphasis added).
90. See id. at 711-12, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (instituting a general balancing test after the
custodial parent has come forward with evidence of a "real advantage"--the equivalent of a
good, sincere reason for wanting the move for her or himself).
91. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 710, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (easing the custodial parent's
burden of proof by construing a standard less restrictive than that practiced in New York); see
also Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1985) (construing the Arizona
standard for relocation by reinterpreting and relaxing the New York rule). Mentioned in connection with the "good reason test", the Bloss decision could also be interpreted to apply the
burden of proof to the respective adversaries similar to the "real advantage" test. Id.; see
supra note 82 and accompanying text. This is a more relaxed view, and the way in which the
Arizona Court of Appeals stresses the constitutional right to travel of the custodial parent
lends credence to this interpretation. Cf. Bloss, 147 Ariz. at 524, 711 P.2d at 663.
92. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 706, 481 N.E.2d at 1155.
93. Physical custody is defined as "physical possession of the minor children." Id. In
Yannas, physical custody was granted to the mother. Id.
94. Legal custody is defined as "a continued mutual responsibility and involvement by
both parents in decisions regarding the child's welfare in matters of education, medical care,
emotion, moral and religious development." Id. at 709, 481 N.E.2d at 1156 (using the statutory language of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1987)). The court in Yannas
granted both parents joint legal custody. Id. at 708, 481 N.E.2d at 1156. See generally
Raines, supra note 56, at 626-27 (arguing that removal should be restricted to promote joint
custody cooperation between parents).
95. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 706, 481 N.E.2d at 1155. The procedural posture of this
case may bear on the court's interpretation. The father was appealing the initial divorce judgment, which included authorization for the mother to relocate to Greece with the children. Id.
In the same procedural posture, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Blake v. Blake, 207
Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988), distinguished all cases that dealt with post-divorce decree
relocation, and held that during the initial custody proceeding the custodial parent did not
require a "compelling reason" for relocation. See id. at 221, 541 A.2d at 1203-04 (1988). The
court nevertheless described the benefits of the move. Id. at 227, 541 A.2d at 1206.
96. Connecticut and Iowa also distinguish between physical and legal custody. Connecticut "permits a court to award joint legal custody, but to award physical custody to one parent." Blake, 207 Conn. at 223, 541 A.2d at 1204 (referring to the requirements of CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-56(a) (1986)). Iowa also differentiates between joint custody and physical care.
See In re Marriage of Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). See generally,
Chambers, supra note 75, at 477 (suggesting solutions for custody disputes); Schepard, Taking
Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 Tax. L. Rav. 687
(1985) (promoting cooperative post-divorce parenting); Woolley, supra note 25, at 16 (listing
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court recognized that, although location may change, the physical
custody of the custodial parent does not, 97 and the decision-making

ability of the noncustodial parent, granted through legal custody, is
not presumptively diminished. 8
The present New Jersey rule, recently formulated in Holder v.
Polanski,9" changes the emphasis of removal determinations. The
standards previously discussed focus on the benefits of relocation to

the child or custodial parent. 00 Holder looks instead to whether the
child will suffer from the relocation' 0 ' and reinterprets the statutory
various types of shared parenting arrangements); Comment, supra note 75, at 577 (advocating
the use of joint custody, and describing its advantages and disadvantages).
97. See Yannas, 395 Mass. at 707-09, 481 N.E.2d at 1155-57. The father in Yannas,
attempted to have the custody decree modified to recognize a presumption in favor of joint
physical custody. Id. at 709, 481 N.E.2d at 1157. The court held that "[n]o state to our
knowledge has adopted by judicial decision a presumption in favor of joint physical custody
. . . [which] is appropriately left to the judge for determination unfettered by any [such]
presumption .... " Id.
98. Cf. Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158 (holding that "[tihe fact that
visitation by the noncustodial parent will be changed to his or her disadvantage cannot be
controlling." ).
99. 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852 (1988).
100. See supra notes 58-98 and accompanying text (describing those standards requiring
benefit to either custodial parent or child). Earlier New Jersey cases also required a showing
that the relocation would be beneficial. See Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56, 491 A.2d 606,
613 (1984); D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 30, affd per
curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976).
101. See Holder, 111 N.J. at 349, 544 A.2d at 855. Virginia and Wisconsin have also
shifted away from requiring benefit. Virginia, without statutory authority, specifically rejected
the Cooper "real advantage" standard, in favor of a consideration of detriment to the child in
restricting removal. See Simmons v. Simmons, 1 Va. App. 358, 362-63, 339 S.E.2d 198, 201
(1986) (citing standards established in Gray v. Gray, 228 Va. 696, 324 S.E.2d 677 (1985)).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in view of a new statute favoring joint custody, held that
restraining an out-of-state move "requires a finding that removal ... will significantly harm or
impede the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent and that this harm to the relationship will work to the child's detriment." Bohms v. Bohms, 144 Wis. 2d 490, 494, 424 N.W.2d
408, 409 (1988) (quoting Long v. Long, 127 Wis.2d 521, 534-35, 381 N.W.2d 350, 357
(1986)) (referring to the effects of the joint custody statute, Wis. STAT. § 767.327 (Supp.
1988), upon relocation decisions). But see Raines, supra note 56, at 656 (arguing that "[i]t is
rarely in the child's best interest to change geographical locations subsequent to a divorce
The standard applied in Colorado is also very similiar. See Casida v. Casida, 659 P.2d 56,
58 (Colo. App. 1982) (sustaining the trial court's ruling that relocation was "not detrimental
to the best interests of the child" upon father's petition to prevent removal). The Casida court
placed the burden of proof on the noncustodial parent, because any other ruling:
would require every custodial parent faced with the prospect of establishing a new
residence outside the jurisdiction of the trial court initially awarding permanent orders to obtain a judicial order modifying extant visitation rights prior to such move.
Such requirement would result in increased utilization of judicial forums in an area
where experience supports the conclusion that judicial interference should be kept at
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0 to hold that "short of an adverse
cause requirement"'
effect on the
noncustodial parent's visitation rights or other aspects of a child's
best interests, the custodial parent should enjoy the same freedom of
movement as the noncustodial parent.' 03 Previous decisions required
a showing of real advantage to the parent, 0 4 but today custodial
parents with custody decrees subject to New Jersey jurisdiction can
move to another state as long as their request to relocate is made in
good faith. 10 5 The court implied that, to prevent removal, the noncustodial parent must prove hardship, 0 6 such as loss of visitation, 0 7

a minimum. Placing the burden of seeking judicial relief upon the party who protests a relocation should encourage private resolution of the emotional and ideological issues both parents invariably confront in these cases.
Id.
102. The statute allows the court to authorize removal of the child from the state "upon
cause shown . . . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (1976). The New Jersey relocation statute provides, "[w]hen the Superior Court has jurisdiction over the custody and maintenance of the
minor children of parents divorced, separated or living separate . . . they shall not be removed
out of its jurisdiction . . . without the consent of both parents, unless the court, upon cause
shown, shall otherwise order." Id. (emphasis added).
This statute is a mirror image of the Massachusetts relocation statute. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 30 (West 1987); see also Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704,
481 N.E.2d 1153 (1985) (interpreting a mirror image of the New Jersey relocation statute to
apply a stricter standard); supra note 87 (setting forth the Massachusetts relocation statute).
103, Holder, 111 N.J. at 352, 544 A.2d at 856.
The Montana Supreme Court has also held that:
[A]ny interference with this fundamental right [to travel] must be made cautiously,
and may only be made in furtherance of the best interests of the child. To that end,
we require the parent requesting the travel restriction to provide sufficient proof that
a restriction is, in fact, in the best interests of the child.
In re Marriage of Cole, 224 Mont. 207, 213, 729 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1986). But see Note, supra
note 21, at 490 (arguing that "a child's best interests are safeguarded only if the custodial
parent is required to satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden.").
104. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 56 491 A.2d 606, 613 (1984) (placing the
burden of proof on the custodial parent to show real advantage as a threshold requirement
before balancing other factors); D'onofrio v. D'onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27,
30, affd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (1976) (determining that when there
is a real advantage to relocating children far away, the court must weigh many factors); Dixon
v. Dixon, 72 N.J. Eq. 588, 66 A. 597 (Ch. 1907) (denying removal for fear of loss of visitation); supra note 71 (outlining the elements of the D'onofrio balancing test later used in
Cooper).
105. Holder, I11N.J. at 352-53, 544 A.2d at 856. Good faith in this instance means
that the custodial parent's wish to move is not coupled with or masking a desire to thwart the
noncustodial parent's visitation privileges. See id.
Iowa, without statutory authority, also allows the parent awarded physical care to relocate, testing such factors as reasons for removal, advantages of the move, impact, etc. See In
re Marriage of Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).
106. See Holder, III N.J. at 353-54, 544 A.2d at 856-57.
107. See id. The court, however, specifically stated that "[n]ot every change in a visitation schedule will prejudice (visitation] rights ....
" Id. See generally Henszey, supra note 47,
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or other possible detriment to the child.108 The standard was
changed in recognition of the parity between men and women being
approached in custody determinations, 10 9 and the implicit realization
that the noncustodial parent has the right to move elsewhere for virtually any reason. 10
Minnesota has one of the least restrictive relocation standards,
which looks upon the denial of relocation as a de facto custody modification."11 In Auge v. Auge," 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court looked
to a custody modification statute," 3 and found that the underlying
at 213 (examining denial of visitation to noncustodial parents); Note, supra note 21, at 489
(promoting the noncustodial parent's visitation rights).
108. See Holder, 111 N.J. at 353-54, 544 A.2d at 856-57. "The emphasis.., should not
be on whether the children or the custodial parent will benefit from the move, but on whether
the children will suffer from it." Id. at 353, 544 A.2d at 857 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 349, 544 A.2d at 855.
110. See id.; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the freedom
of movement available for the noncustodial parent).
111. Compare Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1983) (noting that refusing
relocation often results in a modification of the custody decree) with Hornbeck v. Hornbeck,
702 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Okla. 1985) (holding that a relocation which effectively denies visitation
supports modification of the custody decree).
112. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
113. See id., at 396-97. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a custody modification statute as the authority most important to deciding removal conflicts. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.18(d) (West 1988). The statute provides
Modification of order
(d) If the court has jurisdiction to determine child custody matters, the court shall
not modify a prior custody order unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have
arisen since the prior order, or that were unknown to the court at the time of the
prior order, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the
custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian established by
the prior order unless:
(i) The custodian agrees to the modification;
(ii) The child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with the
consent of the custodian; or
(iii) The child's present environment endangers the child's physical or emotional health or impairs the child's emotional development and the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to
the child.
Id. Although noting that "[t]his statute most frequently comes into play upon a noncustodial
parent's motion that custody be transferred to him or her, rather than in the context of a
motion for removal from the state," Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396-97, the court found the underlying considerations of both issues similar, id., and viewed denying permission to remove as a
conflict often resulting in a modification of custody. Id at 395-96. This view has resulted in a
very relaxed standard. The Auge court decided that "[the modification] statute should be construed as establishing an implicit presumption that removal will be permitted, subject to the
noncustodial parent's ability to establish that removal is not in the best interests of the child,"
id. at 397, and the court's position is justified by its reading of the statute dealing most di-
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considerations of relocation determinations are similar to petitions
for transfer of custody." 4 The Auge court recognized an "implicit
presumption" that removal is in the child's best interests."1 5 To prevent relocation, the noncustodial parent must present a primafacie
case against removal to obtain an evidentiary hearing for custody
modification,'- 6 and permission to remove may be allowed without a
hearing if a prima facie case is not established.""' At the hearing,
the burden of proof is on the noncustodial parent to prove that the

proposed move will undermine the child's best interests." 8
Use of a custodial modification statute in this manner results in
virtually the same result as the California rule allowing a custodial
parent nearly complete freedom to choose a home for the child." 9
rectly with relocation. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 subdiv. 3 (West Supp. 1988), set forth
infra note 115. The decision held that although "[t]his statute should not be read to exclude
all other grounds for denial . . . . [T]he limited purpose of the statute is to safeguard the
visitation rights of the noncustodial parent." Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397. The Auge decision
could also be read to place the burden of proof on the custodial parent to show that removal
will not hurt the noncustodial parent's visitation, therefore undermining the child's best interests. A reading of the statute in this fashion might radically alter Minnesota relocation decisions, and restrict relocation considerably.
114. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397. The Auge court did not differentiate between legal and
physical custody, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (describing the differences
between physical and legal custody); cf. In re Marriage of Stickle, 408 N.W.2d 778, 780
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (differentiating between joint custody and physical care). The Auge
decision focused on the original custody determination, which named the mother as the custodial parent. 334 N.W.2d at 395.
115. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271
(Minn. 1983) (extending the Auge decision to joint custody situations); Madgett v. Madgett,
360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (following the Auge presumption that removal is
in a child's best interest).
The implicit presumption is created by reference to the actual removal statute, MINN.
STAT. ANN, § 518.175 subdiv. 3 (West 1988), in which interference with visitation is the only
specified reason for denying relocation. The statute provides:
Visitation of children and noncustodial parent.
Subd. 3. The custodial parent shall not move the residence of the child to another state except upon order of the court or with the consent of the noncustodial
parent, when the noncustodial parent has been given visitation rights by the decree.
If the purpose of the move is to interfere with visitation rights given to the noncustodial parent by the decree, the court shall not permit the child's residence to be
moved to another state.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the emphasized portion of the statute only mentions thwarting
of visitation rights as the reason for denial of permission to remove, the court pointed out that
this did not exclude other reasons for denying removal, if the other reasons evidenced an undermining of the child's best interests. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397.
116. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 397.
119. See Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63, 223 P.2d 32, 33 (1950); Forslund v.
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The California "residence" statute recognizes a strict presumption in
favor of relocation,12 ° which is only denied when removal threatens
12
the child's welfare. '
IV.

HARMONIZING STATE RELOCATION LAWS

The existence of such divergence between state removal laws is
unfair to both parents. The "accident" of where a couple is divorced
should not arbitrarily favor one partner's parental rights at the cost
of the other partner's liberty, nor vice versa. In light of the mobility
of American society, 2 it is likely that the location of the divorce is
not the only area of the country in which the family has lived, nor
where it would have remained. A parent, unfamiliar with the differences in the laws between the various states, is playing a game of
chance, betting the extended future against the probability that the
law will swing in his or her favor. Harmonizing the diverse state
laws would solve this dilemma, and further the benefits of other uni23
fying legislation.1
The problems inherent in the diversity of state laws can be
solved through either of two avenues. The first is a uniform act,
adopted by all state legislatures, and the second is federal legislation.
The state is the traditional forum for domestic relations adjudiForslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 494, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489, 500 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); see also
supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the California interpretation of the custodial
parent residence statute). But see In re Marriage of Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818, 121
Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (1975) (rejecting removal of a child from jurisdiction without permission
from the noncustodial parent or court, in the context of a suit to recover child support after
long absence and denial of visitation). See supra note 56 (distinguishing Szamocki because of
the bad faith of custodial parent and the context of the relocation decision making).
Alabama has a similiar rule, created by judicial decision. See Pons v. Phillips, 406 So. 2d
932, 934 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied sub nom., Ex parte Phillips, 406 So. 2d 935 (Ala.
1981) (requiring a substantial change in circumstances which would result in harm to the
child to allow prevention of removal and compel a subsequent modification of custody).
120. The California "residence" statute provides, "[a] parent entitled to the custody of a
child has a right to change his residence, subject to the power of the proper court to restrain a
removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." CAL. CIv. CODE § 213
(West 1982) (enacted 1872). But see Engels v. Engels, 297 N.W.2d 489, 491 (S.D. 1980)
(assigning a different interpretation to a mirror image statute).
121. See Dozier v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 719, 334 P.2d 957, 961 (1959) (restricting relocation because the move to Connecticut would aggravate the child's asthma).
122. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
123. The earlier streamlining legislation has been uniform state law, see Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988), and federal legislation, see Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); see also supra notes 4, 6-8, 10-13 (discussing
the different nationwide unifying legislation).
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cation, 124 and a uniform act passed by the state legislatures would
promote the state position as the traditional regulator of family law
matters. 25 Such regulation is merely an extension of the state's
traditional parens patriae power, 126 which includes the power to act
for the protection of minors. 27 The state can balance this concern
against the rights of both parents 28 in legislating relocation issues. 29
At first glance, this appears, to be a workable solution, but any
rule is subject to interpretation, and the force of precedent between
differing state courts of last resort is at best advisory. 130 Therefore,
use of a uniform law in this instance would only perpetuate the same
problems of friction and conflict between the states because of the
predictable divergence in state court interpretations.' 3 '
Federal legislation would be the alternative. Congress previously
entered the area of child custody, 3 2 because it recognized the difficulties of administering custody decisions outside state boundaries,
124. See H. CLARK, supra note 3, at 787.
125. Id.
126. See id.; supra note 24 (discussing parenspatriae jurisdiction).
127. This protection is a result of "[tihe State's special concern with the interrelated,
although of course not identical, matters of custody and visitation [and] is not newborn."
Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981).
See generally Custer, supra note 24, at 195 (outlining the foundations of parens patriae
power).
128. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the
interest in freedom of travel and parental rights).
129. See infra notes 145-150 and accompanying text (suggesting relocation legislation).
130. Divergent interpretations arise consistently in the context of statutory interpretation, compare Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 711, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158
(1985) (interpreting the cause requirement of its relocation statute to compel a showing of
"real advantage" to the custodial parent) with Holder v. Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 350, 544
A.2d 852 (1988) (implying that the cause requirement of the New Jersey relocation statute, a
mirror image of the Massachusetts law, permits relocation unless the noncustodial parent can
prove hardship), and in the context of common law decision-making, compare Weiss, 52
N.Y.2d at 170, 418 N.E.2d at 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (requiring exceptional circumstances
to permit a removal); with Bloss v. Bloss, 147 Ariz. 524, 711 P.2d 663 (interpreting the New
York exceptional circumstances test to apply a significantly less restrictive standard).
131. The divergence among state courts in the interpretation of a uniform law is clearly
demonstrated by cases interpreting § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Compare Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 333, 380 N.E.2d 239, 242, 408
N.Y.S.2d 410, 418 (1978) (recognizing that a response to an offer containing an arbitration
clause is not an acceptance because an arbitration clause is a material addition to a contract)
with Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that
"the question of whether the arbitration provision materially altered the oral offer under Subsection 2-207 (2)(b) is one which can be resolved only by the District Court on further findings
of fact in the present case.").
132. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. §§ 653, 663 (Supp. IV 1986).
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the harm to the children and families involved, and the burdens on
interstate commerce.13 3 The prior federal legislation sought to ease
the enforcement of custody and visitation rulings between the states,
and "discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of
secure family relationships for the child . . -.3.Questions about
relocation touch many of the same issues, including harm to children,135 problems with visitation,ae6 and the preservation of relationships with both parents. 3 7 Congressional action can address these
concerns and strike a singular balance between the right to travel 38
and parental rights.'
Harmony can be established through a reconciliation of the various state laws. Any new legislation must recognize the trend toward relaxation of removal standards, 40 the increased mobilization
of the American population in general,' 4 ' and at the same time
guard the parental rights of the noncustodial parent. 42 Even though
the states already agree that relocation decisions must protect the
best interests of the child,' 43 conflict centers around what is necessary to protect those best interests.'" The legislation suggested by
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; see also supra note 13 (concerning the effects of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act).
134.

28 U.S.C. § 1738A.

135. See supra note 48 (listing state courts recognizing the best interests of the child as
a paramount concern).
136.

Holder v. Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 353, 544 A.2d 852, 856 (1988) (stating that

"[the court] should... consider whether the move will ... adversely affect the visitation rights
of the noncustodial parent.").
137. Before the advent of federal legislation in this area, there was fear that "once the
parent and child are outside of the jurisdiction of the court they are for all practical purposes
beyond the reach of its decrees .... ." Milne v. Goldstein, 194 Cal. App. 2d 552, 557, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 245 (1961).

138. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (recognizing constitutional
protection of freedom of travel); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing

freedom of travel).
139. See supra note 17. But cf. Hershkowitz, supra note 3, at 296 (arguing that the
Supreme Court unnecessarily usurps state power when it enters parental rights termination
proceedings).
140. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

141.

See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.

142.

See supra note 40.

143. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
144. Compare McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 483, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1982)

(recognizing a presumption that removal is against the child's best interests) and In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1988) (inferring that if the move is
to the child's advantage, then the child's best interests are served) and Weiss v. Weiss, 52

N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981) (protecting the child's
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this Note in Part V is a compromise between the various state views.
Although not specifically noted, it entails a balancing of the interests
of both parents. The burden of production is borne by the custodian,
and the final burden of proof rests on the noncustodial parent. The
suggested legislation not only attempts to achieve the interests of
both parents, but also insures maintenance of the child's quality of
life.
V.

SUGGESTED RELOCATION LEGISLATION

REMOVAL OF MINOR CHILD[REN] FROM JURISDICTION OF COURT DETERMINING CUSTODY: SECTION 101: DEFINITIONS

A. Removal: long-term temporary or permanent-migration from
within the jurisdiction of the state court determining the custody decree to another state or to a foreign country.
B. Custodial Parent: the adult who has the position of primary
responsibility for the daily care of the minor child[ren] and is the
adult who provides, for example but not determinatively:
(1) the principle residential arrangements for the minor
child[ren]; or
(2) the majority of day-to-day guidance of the minor
child[ren]; or
(3) the majority of minor day to day decisionmaking about or
for the minor children.
C. Minor Child: a child who is under the age of eighteen and is:
(1) a member of a divorced or dissembled family unit; or
(2) the subject of a previous or forthcoming custody
determination
(a) by mutual agreement of the minor child[ren]'s parents, or
(b) by judicial decree.
D. Best Interests: in the context of removal questions, best interests refers to the minor child [ren] 's ability to maintain a worthwhile
relationship with the custodial parent.
(1) If during divorce proceedings(a) to allow ample visitation by the noncustodial parbest interests requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances to justify removal) with
Holder v. Polansky, 111 N.J. 344, 349, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (1988) (holding that a child's best
interests are served if they suffer no detriment by the removal) and Auge v. Auge, 334
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983) (presuming that removal is in the best interests of the child).
See supra notes 54-121 and accompanying text (outlining the differences between the states).
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ent in a schedule that:
i. allows the creation of a stable home atmosphere;145 and
ii. allows the continuance of a meaningful relationship with the noncustodial parent, with full emphasis given to
the range of alternate
visitation schedules available in the
1 46
particular situation.
(2) If after the divorce decree(a) equivalent (although not necessarily equal) to the
existing relationship of the post-divorce period. 4 '
E. Cause: A demonstration of good faith by the custodial parent. A prima facie showing of good faith by the custodial parent is
evidenced by:
(1) a good reason, from the custodial parent's perspective, for the move; and
(2) demonstration of perspective living arrangements for
the custodial parent and minor child[ren] equivalent (although not necessarily equal) to living arrangements presently available.
(a) Demonstration of prospective living arrangements
carries a rebuttable presumption of suitability.
(3) A good reason may include, but is not limited to 48
(a) remarriage; or
(b) return to location of other members of custodial
parent's family or other previously supportive though unrelated persons; or
(c) career advancement or greater job opportunity; or
145. Cf. Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that "[tihere is a presumption that a request by the custodial parent to remove the child to
another state is in the best interests of the child ... to encourage continuity and stability in

post-dissolution family relationships.").
146.

Cf. Holder, 111 N.J. at 353, 544 A.2d at 857 (stating that "[m]aintenance of a

reasonable visitation schedule by the noncustodial parent remains a critical concern, but in our
mobile society, it may be possible to honor that schedule and still recognize the right of a

custodial parent to move.").
147.

Cf. Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704, 711, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158

(1985) (recogizing that "[i]f [the noncustodial] parent is unfit or has not exercised his or her
rights of visitation, the judge's problem is less difficult than in the case of a diligent noncustodial parent.").

148.

Cf. Holder, I ll N.J. at 352-53, 544 A.2d at 856 (stating that "any sincere, good-

faith reason will suffice, and that a custodial parent need not establish a 'real advantage' from

the move.").
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(d) health reasons.
i. Removal for health reasons, either physical or
mental, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
as a matter of law.
ii. A custodial parent is not subject to an examination by other than his or her own physician to substantiate
the removal for health reasons, except upon the courts
discretion.
(4) Presentation of evidence by the noncustodial parent
of an attempt on the part of the custodial parent to undermine the relationship between the noncustodial parent and
the minor child[ren] is evidence of 149
bad faith and gives the
removal.
restrain
to
discretion
court
F. Objection: A good faith objection by the noncustodial parent
to removal of the minor child[ren] by the custodial parent, based on
a feared diminution in the relationship of the noncustodial parent
and minor child[ren].
(1) A custodial parent may rebut the objection with a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, of a desire to thwart the custodial parent through objection to removal.
(2) In a proceeding after the original divorce decree the noncustodial parent must demonstrate good use of previous visitation privileges during the post-divorce period, subject to rebuttal by the custodial parent. 150
G. Welfare: The physical and mental health and well-being of
the minor child[ren].
(1) To evidence the undermining of the well-being of minor
child[ren], the parent claiming such undermining must demonstrate:
(a) the undermining of the physical health and well149. Cf. Milne v. Goldstein, 194 Cal. App. 2d 552, 557, 15 Cal. Rptr. 243, 245 (1961)
(stating that "if the specific motive is the frustration of the other parent's visitation rights and

is unrelated to the child's welfare, permission to remove will be denied."); Holder, 111 N.J. at
353, 544 A.2d at 856 (holding that "[i]f the court should find that the purpose of the move is
to thwart the non-custodial parent's visitation rights, that obviously will not satisfy the [statutory] test.").
150. Cf. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Il1. 2d 316, 327, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1988)
(weighing the noncustodial parent's exercise of visitation rights granted in the custody decree
in decisions about permitting relocation); Yannas, 395 Mass. at 711, 481 N.E.2d at 1158

(finding the exercise of visitation rights applicable to the balancing test used in relocation
decisions).
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being of the minor child[ren] by a preponderance of the evidence; or
(b) the undermining of the mental health and wellbeing of the minor child[ren] by clear and convincing
evidence.

H. Siblings: Minor children who:
(1) are members of the same family unit under subsection
C(1) of this section and
(2) are subjects of a divorce decree under § 101(C)(2) of this

heading.
SECTION 201: PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF MINOR CHILD[REN] FROM
JURISDICTION

Subject to the definitions in § 101 of this heading:
A. A court of proper jurisdiction will authorize a custodial parent's petition to remove a minor child from its jurisdiction if:
(1) the custodial parent makes a prima facie showing of cause
in favor of removal; and
(2) the noncustodial parent's objection is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, subject to the conditions of § 201(C)
of this heading.
B. A court of proper jurisdiction has discretion to restrain the
custodial parent's removal of a minor child from that jurisdiction if:
(1) the best interests of the child will suffer significantly; or
(2) the welfare of the child will be undermined at the perspective removal location.
C. To restrain removal, absent a showing of the custodial parent's bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence, the noncustodial
parent must demonstrate a willingness and ability to assume the position of custodial parent to the minor child[ren].
(1) Ability to assume the position of custodial position includes fulfilling the conditions of § 101(E)(2) of this heading.
D. If more than one sibling is involved in the relocation, and one
sibling is disqualified from removal, the court may authorize a
change in custody of that minor child to the noncustodial parent,
and permit removal of the custodial parent and the other siblings, if
such does not undermine the welfare of any of the siblings.
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CONCLUSION

The "accident" of where a divorce takes place should not arbitrarily govern the futures of parent and child. Custodial parent relocation decisions require uniformity between the states to promote
impartiality and to further the policies of earlier legislation. The increasing mobility of American society in recent years justifies modification of existing state laws. The adoption of national legislation,
by unanimous state action or Congressional preemption, would eliminate the relocation game of chance currently played by the post-divorce family.
Mandy S. Cohen
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